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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to FED. R. APP. PROC. 27, Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense
Fund (“Eagle Forum”) requests leave to file the accompanying amicus curiae brief
in support of the defendant-appellant Clerk’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The
parties have all consented to this motion.1
IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO FILE
Since its founding in 1981, Eagle Forum has consistently defended
traditional American values, including not only traditional marriage, defined as the
union of husband and wife, but also the religious freedoms that were instrumental
in this Nation’s founding. Although the Supreme Court recently held that our
“Constitution … does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage
on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex,” even that Court
acknowledged that the “First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and
persons are given proper protection.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607
(2015). The litigation thus presents a new issue in this Circuit and nationally on
how to balance the important interests at stake on all side. For the foregoing
reasons, Eagle Forum has a direct and vital interest in the issues raised here.
1

Consistent with FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5), the undersigned counsel certifies
that: counsel for amicus authored this brief in whole; no counsel for a party
authored this brief in any respect; and no person or entity – other than amicus, its
members, and its counsel – contributed monetarily to this brief’s preparation or
submission.
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AUTHORITY TO FILE EAGLE FORUM’S BRIEF
Motions for leave to file an amicus brief should explain the movant’s
interest and “the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters
asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case.” FED. R. APP. P. 29(b). The
Advisory Committee Note to the 1998 amendments to Rule 29 explain that “[t]he
amended rule [Rule 29(b)] … requires that the motion state the relevance of the
matters asserted to the disposition of the case.” The Advisory Committee Note then
quotes Sup. Ct. R. 37.1 to emphasize the value of amicus briefs that bring a court’s
attention to relevant matter not raised by the parties:
An amicus curiae brief which brings relevant matter to
the attention of the Court that has not already been
brought to its attention by the parties is of considerable
help to the Court.
Id. (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 37.1).
As now-Justice Samuel Alito wrote while serving on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, “I think that our court would be well advised to
grant motions for leave to file amicus briefs unless it is obvious that the proposed
briefs do not meet Rule 29’s criteria as broadly interpreted. I believe that this is
consistent with the predominant practice in the courts of appeals.” Neonatology
Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Michael E. Tigar
and Jane B. Tigar, Federal Appeals – Jurisdiction and Practice 181 (3d ed. 1999)
and Robert L. Stern, Appellate Practice in the United States 306, 307-08 (2d ed.
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1989)). Now-Justice Alito quoted the Tigar treatise favorably for the statement that
“[e]ven when the other side refuses to consent to an amicus filing, most courts of
appeals freely grant leave to file, provided the brief is timely and well-reasoned.”
293 F.3d at 133.
FILING THE EAGLE FORUM’S BRIEF WILL SERVE THE
COURT’S RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RAISED
The Eagle Forum brief will aid the Court in resolving the issues of first
impression presented in this appeal and in determining whether to stay the District
Court’s ruling until this Court can determine the appropriate balancing of the
important constitutional rights asserted by the respective parties. In particular, the
Eagle Forum brief covers two important issues that the defendant-appellant did not
address in her motion but which this Court can or even must consider.
First, Eagle Forum argues that – because the balancing test for weighing a
county clerk’s religious-freedom rights against a couple’s right to a marriage
license is unclear, federal courts can incorporate the standards from the Kentucky
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, KY. REV. STAT. §446.350 (“Kentucky
RFRA”), into the county clerk’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §1988(a). Because
the clerk presses Kentucky RFRA, the arguments that the Eagle Forum brief makes
under 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) are available to her, even if she did not argue precisely
the same facet of the issue in her motion. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
534-35 (1992).
3
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Second, Eagle Forum argues that county clerks in Kentucky share the state’s
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which is sufficiently in the
nature of jurisdictional argument for the clerk to raise it for the first time on appeal.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). The asserted basis for suing the
clerk is that her refusal to provide marriage licenses violates federal law as laid
down in Obergefell, but the clerk has denied marriage licenses to both same-sex
and opposite-sex couples (i.e., equally to everyone), which cannot violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984). Similarly,
neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever found a due-process right to
obtain marriage licenses in one’s county of residence, especially when marriage
licenses are readily available nearby. Without an ongoing violation of federal law,
the plaintiffs-appellees cannot make out a case against a government officer like a
county clerk. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002). Without an exception to sovereign immunity, this Court must remand with
orders to dismiss this litigation. Finally, if the Court entered judgment without
resolving the immunity issues that the Eagle Forum brief raises, the county clerk
could collaterally challenge any relief. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S.
137, 152-53 & n.6 (2009). As a result, not only judicial economy but also the needs
to assure itself of the Article III redressability that underlies any relief compel this
Court to consider these issues.

4
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Eagle Forum leave to file its amicus brief.
Dated: August 21, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Lawrence J. Joseph
_______________________________
Lawrence J. Joseph
1250 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202-355-9452
Fax: 202-318-2254
Email: ljoseph@larryjoseph.com

Counsel for Movant Eagle Forum
Education & Legal Defense Fund
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IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO FILE
Amicus curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund (“Eagle
Forum”), a nonprofit corporation, submits this amicus brief in support of the
appellant’s stay application with the accompanying motion for leave to file.1 Since
its founding in 1981, Eagle Forum has consistently defended traditional American
values, including not only traditional marriage, defined as the union of husband
and wife, but also the religious freedoms that were instrumental in this Nation’s
founding. Although the Supreme Court recently held that our “Constitution …
does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms
as accorded to couples of the opposite sex,” even that Court acknowledged that the
“First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). The
litigation thus presents a new issue in this Circuit and nationally on how to balance
the important interests at stake on all side. For the foregoing reasons, Eagle Forum
has a direct and vital interest in the issues raised here.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are same-sex and opposite-sex couples (the “Couples”) residing in
1

Consistent with FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5), the undersigned counsel certifies
that: counsel for amicus authored this brief in whole; no counsel for a party
authored this brief in any respect; and no person or entity – other than amicus, its
members, and its counsel – contributed monetarily to this brief’s preparation or
submission.
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Rowan County, Kentucky, who wish to obtain marriage licenses. The defendant is
the Rowan County Clerk (the “Clerk”), whom Kentucky law authorizes to issue
marriage licenses. In its current configuration, Kentucky’s marriage-license form
would require the Clerk to violate her faith if she issued a marriage license bearing
her name and imprimatur for a same-sex marriage, and she has filed a third-party
complaint against appropriate Kentucky officials to achieve an accommodation of
all parties’ rights under which the Couples could obtain marriage licenses without
a violation of the Clerk’s religious-freedom rights.
In the meantime, the Clerk has ceased dispensing marriage licenses to
anyone, consistent with the Obergefell holding that the “Constitution … does not
permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” 135 S.Ct. at 2607 (emphasis added).
Under Kentucky law, however, the Couples are free to obtain marriage licenses at
more than 100 locations elsewhere in the state, KY. REV. STAT. §402.080,
including the two metropolitan areas to which the Couples have travelled to attend
proceedings before the District Court below. See Stay Appl. at 3 (60 miles to
Ashland and 100 miles to Covington).2 The Couples’ traveling those distances does
not appear to have presented a significant burden.

2

Catlettsburg (the county seat of Boyd County) is in the Huntington-AshlandIronton metropolitan area, and Covington is a county seat of Kenton County.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although the Couples demand their rights under Obergefell, this litigation
requires the Court to balance the Couples’ asserted marriage rights with the Clerk’s
free-exercise rights. Because neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have set the
appropriate test for weighing these competing rights (Section I.A), federal law is
therefore “deficient … to furnish suitable remedies” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. §1988(a). Under the circumstances, a federal court evaluating this conflict
in Kentucky can and should look to the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, KY. REV. STAT. §446.350 (“Kentucky RFRA”), to balance these interests
(Section I.B).
In Kentucky, the county clerk is a constitutional office that enjoys sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment (Section
II.A.1.). No decision of the Supreme Court or this Court has ever addressed –
much less found – a constitutional right to obtain a marriage license in one’s
county of residence, particularly where marriage licenses are readily available
elsewhere and nearby in the state. Moreover, the Clerk here ceased providing
marriage licenses to anyone, thereby ensuring the equal treatment that Obergefell
mandates. Under the circumstances, there is no ongoing violation of federal law
(Section II.A.2.), which is a precondition for sidestepping sovereign immunity
under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity (Section II.A). Because

3
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the Clerk may raise her immunity not only for the first time on appeal but also
collaterally even after an adverse judgment, this Court must consider her immunity
in deciding the stay application to ensure it has jurisdiction and can issue an order
that provides redress (Section II.B.).
ARGUMENT
Amicus Eagle Forum fully supports the Clerk’s religious-freedom arguments
but writes separately in the abbreviated briefing of her stay application to make
two primary points that this Court can consider at this stage and on the merits.
First, this Court can and should rely on Kentucky RFRA to balances the parties’
respective interests here under 42 U.S.C. §1988(a). Second, the Clerk is immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY BALANCE THE
CLERK’S RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM RIGHTS WITH THE COUPLES’
MARRIAGE RIGHTS
The same-sex plaintiffs driving this litigation impatiently assert their new

rights under Obergefell and thus frame this litigation exclusively as the denial of
their rights. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Couples,
however, amicus Eagle Forum respectfully submits that this litigation requires the
balancing of competing rights.3 Moreover, in the context of balancing the
competing federal rights at issue, federal civil rights law provides for looking to
3

As explained in Section II.A.2., infra, amicus Eagle Forum respectfully
submits that the Couples do not, in fact, have a federal right to assert here.

4
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state laws such as Kentucky RFRA when federal law itself does not provide a
framework for striking the right balance.
A.

No Precedent of this Court or the Supreme Court Expressly
Provides a Balancing Test for the Two Rights at Issue Here

Although the Couples emphasize that the Clerk is a public officer, we are
long past the era of Justice Holmes’ famous dictum that a policeman “may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.” McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). As a result, public officers and employees no longer
“may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights” in
all circumstances. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also
Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006)
(rationale of public-employee free-speech cases applies to free-exercise cases); cf.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (government cannot condition public
benefits on accepting Saturday employment if that is contrary to religious faith).
Cases like this necessarily must strike the right balance between the
employee’s right and the larger public right. Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030,
1036 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, courts routinely balance rights against each other.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874
(1992) (women’s right to abortion versus states’ right to regulate women’s health
and interest in the unborn child’s life); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
5
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398-99 (1979) (criminal defendants’ due-process rights versus the media’s and the
public’s freedom of the press). When federal courts strike such balances in specific
contexts – especially in areas of judge-made law – the resulting balancing test
necessarily appears nowhere in the Constitution. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 878
(creating “undue-burden” test); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
547-48 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, the Supreme Court has created a
new right to same-sex marriage, recognized that that new right may conflict with
religious liberty, but not as yet provided a balancing test for resolving the
inevitable conflicts. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607. This case of first impression
therefore requires this Court to strike the right balance between the Clerk’s rights
and those asserted by the Couples.
B.

The Clerk’s Rights under Kentucky RFRA Are Enforceable in
this Federal Challenge

The Clerk has asserted rights under Kentucky RFRA against compelling her
to violate her religious beliefs, but the District Court rejected the use of Kentucky
law in that context. Amicus Eagle Forum respectfully submits that, given the
absence of federal law to resolve the balancing of the Clerk’s religious freedom
versus the Couples’ marriage rights, a federal court should look to state law to
balance the sensitive civil rights issues here:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred
on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24,
and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all
6
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persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for
their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in
all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause[.]
42 U.S.C. §1988(a).4 Because existing federal precedents and laws do not guide
federal courts on how to balance the rights at issue here, this Court can look to
Kentucky RFRA. See Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2007).
Nothing in Kentucky RFRA is inconsistent with federal law.
II.

THIS COURT AND THE DISTRICT COURT LACK JURISDICTION
TO COMPEL THE CLERK TO ACT AGAINST HER RELIGION
As explained below, the Clerk’s constitutional office is entitled to sovereign

immunity under Kentucky law, and she may assert that immunity for the first time
on appeal or even collaterally after judgment. Nothing in Obergefell creates an
absolute right to receive marriage licenses in Rowan County – at least not when
As used in §1988(a), “Title 24” includes 28 U.S.C. §1343 and 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 n.7 (1972). Although 28
U.S.C. §1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) do not elevate Kentucky law to an
independent federal cause of action, Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
700-04 (1973), they do allow federal courts to resort to state law, as necessary, to
declare the law “not inconsistent with the Constitution… of the United States.” 42
U.S.C. §1988(a).
4
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marriage licenses are readily available elsewhere in Kentucky – and the Clerk’s
even-handed denial of licenses to both same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples
easily satisfies the equality principles in Obergefell. For that reason, there is no
ongoing violation of federal law and thus no basis for sidestepping the Clerk’s
immunity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. In sum, the
federal courts have no power to compel the Clerk to act.
A.

Sovereign Immunity Denies Federal Courts the Authority to
Compel the Clerk to Issue Marriage Licenses

Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Sovereign
immunity arises also from the Constitution’s structure and antedates the Eleventh
Amendment, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999), applying equally to
suits by a state’s own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh
Amendment bars suits for both money damages and injunctive relief unless the
state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-16. The test for waiver is “a
stringent one,” and “consent … must be unequivocally expressed.” Sossamon v.
Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011) (interior quotations and citations omitted).
Nothing suggests that Kentucky or the Clerk have waived sovereign immunity.
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Under the officer-suit exception of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
however, sovereign immunity does not bar some suits in which the plaintiff seeks
only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to avert an ongoing violation of
federal law. This analysis requires a “straightforward inquiry into whether the
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535
U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (interior quotations omitted). In the absence of an ongoing
violation of federal law, however, the Young exception does not relieve plaintiffs
of the defendant’s immunity. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645; accord Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t
of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 966 (6th Cir. 2013). As explained below, the Couples have
not identified an ongoing violation of federal law sufficient to trigger Young.
Although the Clerk did not raise sovereign immunity in her stay application,
the defense is sufficiently jurisdictional that she can raise it at any time, even on
appeal: the “Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court.” Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th
Cir. 1996). Indeed, sovereign immunity is one of the few jurisdictional arguments
that one can raise collaterally to attack an adverse judgment. Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152-53 & n.6 (2009). For that reason, amicus Eagle Forum
respectfully submits that, under the circumstances, this Court must consider the
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Clerk’s immunity: “a federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the
court’s jurisdiction is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d
at 206 (emphasis in original, alterations and internal quotations omitted).
1.

Kentucky’s Sovereign Immunity Applies to County Clerks

Although county clerks in some states may lack their state’s immunity from
suit under the Eleventh Amendment, county clerks in Kentucky are immune from
suit to the same extent as the state. Schwindel v. Meade Cnty., 113 S.W.3d 159,
163 (Ky. 2003). “County Clerk” is a constitutional office, St. Matthews Fire Prot.
Dist. v. Aubrey, 304 S.W.3d 56, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), and indeed “the existence
of counties predates the Commonwealth itself.” Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 131 n.1 (Ky. 2004). Further, “when an officer
or employee of a governmental agency is sued in [a] representative capacity, the
officer’s or employee’s actions are afforded the same immunity, if any, to which
the agency, itself, would be entitled.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky.
2001). As such, the Clerk is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
Although the Couples have styled their suit against the Clerk individually,
their request for declaratory and injunctive relief is necessarily a representativecapacity suit: if she left office, the Clerk would be wholly unaffected by
declaratory or injunctive relief and would be without power to redress any injury.
Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 18 (1950). Indeed, suits against officials in their
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“individual capacity under color of legal authority” are simply the flip side of
representative-capacity suits against them in their “official capacity,” where former
denies any authority whatsoever for the challenged action taken “under the color of
authority.” See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 539 (1980); cf. 5 U.S.C. §702, 28
U.S.C. §1391(e) (listing official-capacity and color-of-legal-authority actions as
distinct). “Astute practitioners know [to name officers individually], and suits
against officers in their personal capacity are likely to be numerous in the future as
they have been in the past.” Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely
Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 CHI. L. REV. 435, 453-54 (1962). At least for
purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief, the Couples have brought a
representative-capacity suit.
2.

The Couples Cannot Allege a Violation of Federal Law
Sufficient to Invoke the Ex parte Young Exception to
Sovereign Immunity

Even without the problem of a court’s needing to balance competing federal
rights discussed in Section I.A, supra, no marriage-rights decision of the Supreme
Court has ever found an absolute right to obtain a marriage license in one’s county
of residence, especially when marriage licenses are readily available nearby. Cf.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (significant travel distances for women seeking an abortion
do not violate that judge-made right). To the extent that the language of a decision
would support that perceived right, that language would be mere dicta when the
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court did not face that specific question: “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an
argument that they never dealt with.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678
(1994). Accordingly, there is no substantive due-process right to obtain marriage
licenses in Rowan County under the Due Process Clause.
Similarly, the Clerk’s denying marriage licenses to both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples defeats any claim to an equal-protection violation:
[W]hen the right invoked is that to equal treatment, the
appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a
result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits
from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits
to the excluded class
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984) (emphasis in original, interior
quotations omitted). The Clerk has adopted an interim solution that, quite frankly,
could qualify as a permanent solution under the Equal Protection Clause. The
treatment is entirely equal. But even the Clerk does not propose that her interim
solution remain in place forever. Instead, her third-party complaint seeks relief
from Kentucky that would alleviate the need for her to violate her religious beliefs
while enabling Couples (and future couples) to obtain marriage licenses even in
Rowan County. See Stay Appl. at 14-15. In any event, there clearly is no ongoing
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Given that there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Couples
have no basis for sidestepping the Clerk’s sovereign immunity to seek prospective
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relief to enforce federal law. As such, this Court should remand with orders to
dismiss the Couples’ suit.
B.

The Couples Cannot Establish Redressability Because the Clerk
Would Remain Free to Attack this Court’s Judgment Collaterally
on Sovereign Immunity Grounds

Under Bailey, 557 U.S. at 152-53 & n.6, the Clerk remains free to attack a
judgment of this Court or the District Court collaterally on immunity grounds if
this Court does not resolve the immunity issue. As such, amicus Eagle Forum
respectfully submits that the Couples will not have established that a federal court
can redress their injury unless the immunity issue resolves in the Couples’ favor.
Without redressability, of course, an Article III court must not render judgment at
all. Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 2009). For that
reason, amicus Eagle Forum respectfully submits that this Court must address the
Clerk’s immunity from suit.
CONCLUSION
This Court should stay the District Court’s order dated August 12, 2015,
pending final resolution of the appeal in this Court.
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